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Abstract 
 
This paper uses data from early 20
th
 century to 1971 to estimate a production function for 
the Norwegian winter herring fishery, which collapsed in the early 1970s. The focus is on 
technological progress and the sensitivity of the catch per unit of effort to the size of the 
stock. This relationship appears to have become stronger rather than weaker as a result of 
the introduction of the sonar and the power block. The productivity increase appears to 
have been greatest for the power block, and then for echo sounders and engines used in 
auxiliary boats. Estimates of stock elasticity indicate little sensitivity of the catch per unit 
of effort to the size of the fish stock. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Around 1970 the herring stocks in the Northeast Atlantic were nearly fished to extinction. 
Spring spawning stocks at Iceland and the Faeroe Islands disappeared and have not 
returned, leaving only Norwegian spring spawning herring. Only in the mid-1980s did 
this stock begin to recover, after several years of virtually no fishing. North Sea herring 
and Icelandic autumn spawners also took years to recover. 
 
This collapse is usually attributed to a technological revolution in the herring fisheries 
that occurred in the 1960s.
1
 This revolution was two-pronged. A mechanical winch, 
usually called power block, was installed for pulling the seines used for catching the fish. 
This allowed the use of larger seines and, in turn, larger boats. Secondly, fish finding 
equipment (sonar) was developed. This made it possible to detect shoals of fish 
underneath the surface of the sea, whereas previously they had been located by observing 
ripples on the surface. 
 
The power block was installed in virtually all Norwegian purse seine boats over just a 
few years. That in itself speaks volumes about the productivity gains obtained with this 
equipment. Unfortunately this was a passing episode. Shortly after the said technology 
revolution the herring stocks crashed, and catching herring was banned for years 
afterwards. In the meantime, the fishing fleet survived by turning to previously 
unexploited stocks of capelin that could be fished with this technology. 
 
The effect on a fish stock of a leap in productivity depends critically on how sensitive the 
fish catch is to the size of the stock. If the catch per unit of fishing effort
2
 is proportional 
to the size of the stock, catches will fall proportionally with the stock for a given level of 
effort, providing some protection as it were from increased effort or rising productivity.
3
 
If on the other hand the catch of fish is not very sensitive to the stock size it could be 
maintained at a high level even as the stock is depleted, increasing the risk of depletion 
below the critical level of viability. Needless to say, this turn of events is predicated on 
the absence of any fish stock management, but that was indeed the reality before the 
advent of the exclusive economic zone when stocks were fished on the high seas by fleets 
from many different nations competing with one another. The Norwegian spring 
spawning herring was exploited by fishing fleets from many nations, most notably 
Norway, Iceland and the Soviet Union. Any effort at saving the stock would have 
required a joint action by all three and probably others as well, as long as the stock was 
accessible on the high seas. This was not attempted, and it is doubtful if the problem was 
recognized in a timely enough fashion to initiate any such action. As the stock was 
depleted, its extensive migrations ceased and it became confined to Norwegian waters, 
which in 1977 were extended from 12 to 200 nautical miles with the establishment of the 
                                                 
1
 The collapse of the herring stocks coincided with a falling sea temperature, which is also suspected for 
having contributed to the collapse (Toresen and Østvedt, 2000). 
2
 Fishing effort is a measure of the activity of the fishing fleet aimed at catching the fish, such as the 
number of boats or men multiplied by the time fishing. 
3
 For a formal analysis, see Hannesson (1993). 
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exclusive economic zone. Norwegian fishing of the stock virtually came to a halt and 
may have rescued it from irreversible depletion. 
 
At about the time when the herring stocks were heading for a collapse, fisheries 
biologists began to notice the low sensitivity of the catch per unit of effort to the size of 
the stock. Ulltang (1980) found this to be the case for the Norwegian spring spawning 
herring, using data from the 1950s and 60s. Bjørndal (1987), using a different 
methodology, reached a similar conclusion for the North Sea herring. Bjørndal‟s data 
covered years after the new fishing technology had become established, while at least 
some of Ulltang‟s data were from years before the technological revolution had taken 
place. Still, one may ask whether this weak relationship between the catch per unit of 
effort and the stock size was of long standing or brought about by the new technology 
that made it easier to find and to encircle large shoals of fish. 
 
In this paper we shall investigate the winter herring fishery in Norway, using data from 
the early 1900s until the crash in 1971. We will also use a more detailed data set available 
for the purse seine fishery from 1932. This fishery began in 1925, but due to its 
technological development and the dwindling of the fish stock it was the only one that 
remained in the end. The winter herring fishery exploited the spawning migration of the 
herring, which in winter comes in from the Norwegian Sea to the west coast of Norway. 
The duration of this migration varied; sometimes it began as early as late December, but 
could begin as late as early February. By March or April the fishery was over. There is a 
strong indication that the duration of the migration varied with the stock size, as will be 
seen in Section 3. 
 
Our investigation is concerned with two things. The first is the sensitivity of the catch per 
unit of effort to the stock size. Is it low (close to zero), as often believed to be the case for 
stocks like herring, which aggregate in shoals? This would mean that the catch per unit of 
effort can be maintained despite a dwindling stock, so increasing the risk of a crash such 
as the one that in fact took place in the late 1960s. The second question we look at is the 
development of productivity in the fishery. How rapid was it? Is it possible to identify 
productivity gains with the coming into use of new equipment such as fish finders, echo 
sounders, nylon seines, or the power block? Did the new equipment make the catch per 
unit of effort less sensitive to the stock size, thus increasing the vulnerability of the stock? 
 
2. A PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR THE FISHERY 
 
The winter herring fishery was traditionally conducted with gill nets, land seines and 
purse seines. The first two are represented in the data from the beginning in 1909, while 
the purse seine came on the scene in 1925. Trawl was also used for a few years in the 
1960s, but will be disregarded in what follows. Land seines disappeared from the 
statistics in 1960 and gill nets in 1969, so towards the end the winter herring fishery was 
increasingly conducted by purse seiners.
4
 
                                                 
4
 The fisheries statistics were compiled and published by the Directorate of Fisheries. There is some 
ambiguity in the data as to which kind of gear was being used. In some years the statistics list various 
combinations of land seines and purse seines and even gill nets. Therefore, there is undoubtedly some error 
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A production function specification often used in fisheries economics is the following:
5
 
 
(1) a b gtt t tY E qS e  
 
where Yt is the catch of fish at time t, Et is fishing effort, St is the size of the fish stock 
exploited, and the exponential term takes care of technological progress. 
 
If a = 1, there are constant returns to fishing effort. Dividing through by E, we get catch 
per unit of effort (y): 
 
(2) b gtt ty qS e , a = 1. 
 
If b = 1, catch per unit of effort would be a perfect index of the stock size, except that 
with technical progress (g > 0) the catch per unit of effort would rise faster, or fall more 
slowly, than the stock. The parameter b shows the dependence of the catch per unit of 
effort on the stock size; as b falls it becomes weaker, and for b = 0 the catch per unit of 
effort is constant (but rising over time if there is technical progress) and independent of 
the stock. 
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Figure 1: The number of fishermen per boat (team for land seines) 1909-1971. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the data on how the catches and participation in the fishery are split between the three categories we have 
used. 
5
 This formulation is most appropriate for a continuous time model. With a discrete time model one would 
ideally have to take into account how the fish stock is fished down from the beginning to the end of the 
period as well as its growth over the period. We shall disregard this, and the available data would hardly 
allow this to be done properly. The fishing took place while the stock was on a spawning migration, so 
there may have been a more or less continuous flow of fish towards, and then away from, the spawning 
grounds, rather than an initial stock in place being thinned by the fishery. Hence Equation (1) is likely to be 
a good approximation. 
 4 
 
Fishing effort is produced by combining real capital in the form of fishing boats and their 
equipment with manpower and intermediate inputs. There are data on the number of 
boats (teams for land seines) and the number of fishermen using various gear types, but 
the number of boats and the number of fishermen are too closely correlated to be used 
together as regressors, so we have to define effort as either the number of fishermen or 
the number of boats or teams. Nevertheless, there is some variation over time in the 
number of fishermen per boat or team. Figure 1 shows the number of fishermen per boat 
(team for land seines) over the period considered. The most conspicuous change is the 
abrupt fall in the number of fishermen per purse seiner in the 1960s. This was brought 
about by the introduction of the power block, clearly an effective labor saving device. 
The number of fishermen per purse seiner fell from about 20 in 1963 to about 11 in 1966. 
Over the same period the share of boats using power block rose from 3 percent to 99 
percent. Other things we may note is a fairly steady decline in the number of men per 
land seine team from 1909 to 1940, and a jump upwards to a still low and relatively 
stable level after that. The number of fishermen per gill net boat stayed fairly constant at 
about five up until 1929, rising gradually after that to almost ten in 1960, and than falling 
rather abruptly back to five in 1969, when the gill net fishery came to an end. 
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Figure 2: Norwegian spring spawning herring. Spawning stock and total stock. Source: Toresen and 
Østvedt (2000). 
 
As to the stock, estimates of its size are available from Toresen and Østvedt (2000). 
These estimates show both the total stock and the mature (spawning) part of it. The 
fisheries we are concerned with here fished on the spawning migration of the stock, but 
younger year classes of fish were also at least partly available for the fishery. Here we 
will use both and try to ascertain which one is a more appropriate measure of the stock 
exploited by the fishery. Figure 2 shows how the stock developed over time. The 
spawning stock was usually well over a half of the total stock, and both developed in a 
roughly similar way, but over time the share of the mature part declined, as fewer fish 
survived to maturity due to a rising rate of exploitation. Note that even with a constant 
degree of exploitation the mature stock would have developed somewhat differently from 
the total stock, because the size of the stock is largely determined by exceptionally large 
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year classes that appear from time to time and do not become mature until they are 4-5 
years old. 
 
Table 1 shows the results from estimating the parameters of Equation (1) for the three 
main gear types, using effort and catch per unit of effort, both lagged one period, as 
instrumental variables for effort. There is a strong correlation between the number of 
fishermen or boats each year and the number the year before, and there is a positive 
correlation between the catch per man (or boat/team) the year before and the number of 
fishermen (boats/teams) participating in the fishery in any particular year, although the 
latter is significant only for purse seining and land seine teams.
6
 
 
Table 1: Results of estimating Equation (1), using effort and catch per unit of effort lagged one period as 
instrumental variables for effort. t-values in parentheses. ** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
Gear Stock Effort a b g Constant R
2
 
Land 
seine 
(1909-
1959) 
Spawning Men .2853 
(0.88) 
.2735 
(0.52) 
-.0370 
(0.89) 
1.8183 
(0.53) 
0.4202 
Teams .0908 
(0.37) 
.4517 
(0.85) 
-.0605 
(1.86) 
2.5077 
(0.69) 
0.3611 
Total Men .1869 
(0.38) 
.4988 
(0.58) 
-.0499 
(0.79) 
.6264 
(0.15) 
0.4026 
Teams -.1124 
(0.31) 
.9970 
(1.22) 
-.0868 
(1.88) 
-1.1018 
(0.21) 
0.3319 
Gill nets 
(1909-
1968) 
Spawning Men 1.1505 
(7.40**) 
.5285 
(3.01**) 
.0231 
(4.33**) 
-8.7421 
(12.38**) 
0.9091 
Boats 1.3258 
(7.64**) 
.3748 
(1.99) 
.0414 
(5.76**) 
-7.0902 
(10.23**) 
0.9116 
Total Men 1.2349 
(8.89**) 
.5093 
(2.78**) 
.0257 
(5.15**) 
-9.6677 
(10.84**) 
0.9046 
Boats 1.4343 
(8.95**) 
.2883 
(1.42) 
.0456 
(6.79**) 
-7.3728 
(7.67**) 
0.9051 
Purse 
seine 
(1925-
1971) 
Spawning Men .6904 
(2.12*) 
.3977 
(2.57*) 
.0329 
(2.76**) 
-3.3482 
(1.91) 
0.6104 
Boats .9264 
(2.67*) 
0.3946 
(2.98**) 
.0282 
(2.38*) 
-2.5095 
(1.94) 
0.6338 
Total Men .7731 
(2.73**) 
.4424 
(2.76**) 
.0341 
(2.87**) 
-4.7172 
(2.83**) 
0.6078 
Boats .9970 
(3.28**) 
.4612 
(3.33**) 
.0303 
(2.61*) 
-3.8088 
(2.78**) 
0.6385 
 
 
The results in Table 1 are not very decisive with respect to which would be the most 
appropriate measure of the available stock, the total stock or the spawning stock. For 
purse seine we get higher point estimates and t-values for the total stock than the 
                                                 
6
 OLS gives similar results, but is plagued by serial correlation. 
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spawning stock, but for gill nets the opposite. It is of course possible that these two gear 
types fished on different stock components, but the results are hardly strong enough to 
support that conclusion. The point estimates for land seines indicate that the total stock is 
a better measure, but these estimates are not significantly different from zero and so do 
not really support a clear conclusion. 
 
All the estimates for land seine are insignificant, but this is not entirely unexpected. Land 
seines were operated from land, and their success depended critically on the migration of 
the fish, i.e., whether they would pass sufficiently close to shore to be captured by the 
land seines. This varied considerably from one year to another. The results in Table 1 
indicate that the passage of the stock critically close to shore was largely determined by 
random factors. 
 
For gill nets and purse seines we get significant and reasonable coefficients. The 
coefficient for effort is in most cases not significantly different from one, implying 
constant returns to scale (the exception is gill net boats with total stock). For the fish 
stock we get significantly positive estimates, but all are significantly less than one. Hence 
the catch per unit of effort appears to have increased with the stock, but at a diminishing 
rate. For the time variable we get coefficients implying technical progress of 3-5 percent 
a year. This is a bit on the high side but not totally unbelievable, since we know that there 
was substantial technological progress in the fishery over the period in question. 
 
The problem with these estimates is, however, that they are very sensitive to shortening 
of the time series. If we end the time series in the early 1960s both a and b become 
insignificant both for gill nets and purse seines, and the point estimates may even turn 
negative. Shortening the series at the beginning leads to less dramatic changes; for the 
gill net boats it raises the estimates of b to around 1. This instability of the estimates 
makes it difficult to take them seriously. Perhaps we may conclude that the “stock effect” 
is very weak; the stock elasticity (b) is probably small and close to zero, implying that the 
catch per unit of effort is nearly independent of how large the stock is. In fact, for gill net 
boats the said coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
 
3. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE PURSE SEINE FISHERY 
 
The purse seine fishery was undoubtedly the one that experienced the most radical 
technological progress. Already before the Second World War, the auxiliary boats 
helping to close and pull the seine became equipped with engines. In the 1960s the sonar 
and the power block became widespread. The report published each year on the winter 
herring fishery contains information on how may of these devices the boats were 
equipped with, as well as information on boat values, participation in the fishery and the 
amount of fish caught.
7
 Initially these reports covered only the fishery south of Stadt, but 
from 1942 on the herring fisheries north of there were also included. This is probably not 
a problem, since much of the fishing took place south of Stadt in the early period. We 
have pushed the time series back to 1932, but the degree of detail reported increased as 
                                                 
7
 These reports are published in the series ”Årsberetninger vedrørende Norges fiskerier”, published by the 
Directorate of Fisheries. 
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time went on, until the late 1960s when the reporting again became less detailed. First we 
shall discuss the information that seems potentially useful for estimating a production 
function for the fishery and the technological progress that occurred and then report on 
the results from using this information. 
 
Value of boats 
 
For the years 1932-1963 the average value of purse seiners was published. This we have 
converted to constant value of money, using the consumer price index. For the years 
1942-1968, with one exception, information was provided on the average size of boats, 
measured as cargo capacity volume (hectoliters). There is a very close relationship 
between the average size and the average value of the boats, which we have used to 
estimate the average value of the boats 1964-68. For 1969-1971 no special reports on the 
winter herring fishery were published, only summary statistics in the ordinary fishery 
statistics. For these years we have assumed a value of 650. Figure 3 shows the average 
size and value of purse seiners for overlapping years, as well as a curve fitted to them by 
a linear regression involving both size and size squared. The average boat size 1964-68 
varied between 2100 and 2750 hl and was thus well within the range for which we have 
observations of both value and size. 
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Figure 3: Average value („000 1968-kroner) and size (hl. cargo capacity) of purse seiners 1942-1960 and 
1962-3, with a parabolic curve fitted to the observations. 
 
Weather and season length 
 
The reports on the winter herring fishery contain quite detailed information on the 
weather, when the herring fishery began, and whether any fish was caught this or that 
day. From 1942 to 1961 diaries recorded by a skipper were published as a part of the 
winter herring fishery report. It is difficult, however, to construct an index of fishing days 
from this information; the area where the fishery took place is quite extensive and the 
weather not necessarily uniform over the entire area. In some years the diary-keeper quit 
the fishery early, so keeping to his diaries would provide too few fishing days. We settled 
 8 
 
for constructing a weather index on the basis of how each fishing season was 
characterized in the reports and the diary, compared to earlier seasons, giving a value of 0 
to exceptionally bad years and 2 for exceptionally good ones, with 1 for normal years. 
This resulted in 9 bad and 8 good years out of 40, and hence 23 normal years. As to 
duration of season, tables of catches at the end of each week are published in the reports. 
From this we compiled the number of weeks, leaving out weeks with less than 1 percent 
of the aggregate catches. This provides some correction for length of season. In some 
years weeks with virtually no catches occurred in the middle of the season. This could be 
due to poor weather conditions, but could also be due to interruptions in the herring 
migration. 
 
Technical change 
 
In the period 1932-1971 the technology in the herring fishery changed beyond 
recognition. The winter herring reports make it possible to trace the technological 
innovations, at least to an extent. The indices in Figure 4 show the number of equipment 
recorded divided by the number of boats. This should come close to showing the share of 
the fleet using the equipment in question, but some boats could have had more than one 
piece of equipment and others none; for later years the statistics show more radio 
receivers, radars, and echo sounders than there were boats. For these cases the index has 
been set equal to one. 
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Figure 4: Indices of equipment used in the fishery. The index shows the number of equipment divided by 
the number of boats, but with a maximum of one. 
 
The first major new equipment to be introduced was radio receivers. In 1938 10 percent 
of the boats had receivers. This is likely to have been helpful for following news about 
whether the herring had come within range and where it had been found, as well as 
weather reports. The number of radio transmitters (not shown) was in the beginning close 
to the number of receivers, and in most cases these were probably one and the same. The 
abrupt fall 1941-45 is due to the banning of this equipment by the German occupation 
authorities, although exemptions were usually granted as the season progressed. 
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The statistics for 1940 shows that 36 percent of the auxiliary boats used for hauling in the 
purse seine were fitted out with engines. Before the power block appeared on the scene 
the purse seine was hauled in by hand, a very demanding work. The engines did not make 
this any easier, but must have greatly increased the maneuverability of the boats and the 
likelihood that a shoal of herring would be enclosed in a timely fashion and prevented 
from escaping. In addition the engines should have saved much labor otherwise needed 
for rowing the boats. It is highly likely that the engines were introduced gradually already 
before 1940, as the fraction of boats using this equipment increased gradually from 1940 
on, but on this the reports are silent. 
 
In 1947 echo sounders suddenly appear, and their number was 40 percent of the number 
of boats. As for the engines in the auxiliary boats, this equipment may have been 
introduced more gradually, but it was undoubtedly difficult to obtain during the war, and 
the first post-war years were characterized by rationing, inter alia of foreign currency. 
Echo sounders were useful for finding fish, which showed up as black spots on a roll of 
paper. 
 
Sonar equipment (asdic) came much later than the echo sounders.
8
 This equipment makes 
it possible to detect fish concentrations underneath the surface of the ocean. They do not 
have to be right underneath the boat, as for the echo sounder, and their movements can be 
studied. Prior to the sonar, suitable concentrations of herring were usually detected as 
ripples on the water. Nevertheless, the sonar caught on more slowly than the echo 
sounder; two pieces of equipment appeared in 1955, but it was not until 1967 that the 
number of sonar equipment reached the same level as the number of boats. Nylon seines 
are reported for the first time in 1960 when their number was about half the number of 
boats, but the reports for earlier years mention nylon seines without noting their number. 
Nylon seines did not need to be dried as regularly as cotton seines and were stronger. 
Judging from this information on the nylon seines, some of the technology variables may 
show a too abrupt introduction of the equipment in question, especially when a large 
fraction of the boats suddenly seems to be equipped with it. The sonar and the power 
block are not in this category, as they first appear in small numbers relative to the number 
of boats. 
 
Radar is a navigation equipment. In 1960 the number of radars was about one-third of the 
number of boats. Its use spread rapidly; almost 60 percent had radar a year later and then 
70 percent in 1962, and in 1968 there were more radars than boats (some may have had 
two and some none). But what spread most rapidly of all, apart from nylon seines, was 
the power block. In 1963 only three percent of the boats had it, a year later 30 percent, in 
1965 almost 70 percent, and in 1966 virtually all boats were equipped with power block. 
The power block made it possible to haul in the purse seines mechanically, did away with 
the use of the auxiliary boats and was hugely labor saving; the average number of 
fishermen per purse seiner fell from about 20 in 1964 to 11 in 1966. 
                                                 
8
 Asdic is a British acronym, the first three letters being derived from anti-submarine division. Sonar is an 
American acronym, derived from sound navigation and ranging. Both describe essentially the same type of 
equipment, but sonar is the one most widely used. These technologies, which originally had a military use, 
were adapted for fishing after the Second World War. 
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Estimating a production function 
 
As already discussed, the fishing season varied in length, and the weather conditions 
certainly differed from year to year. It turns out that the season‟s length is highly 
correlated with the size of the fish stock
9
 and that including it in the regression only 
reduces the value of the stock elasticity and makes it insignificant while the season‟s 
length variable is significant. It therefore makes little sense to include both in the 
regression. A likely explanation of this is that the larger the stock the longer the fish 
migration lasted, thus lengthening the fishing season. It thus appears doubtful whether the 
stock elasticity means that more fish can be caught per unit of effort, effort having a time 
dimension and being defined as the number of boats or fishermen times the days they 
were fishing. Instead, a larger stock simply could mean a longer fishing season. In Table 
2 below we report estimates both for effort defined as the number of participating 
fishermen or boats and as fishermen or boats multiplied by the season‟s length in weeks. 
The regressions were run for both the total stock and the spawning stock, but the point 
estimates of b and their t-values were in all cases higher for the total stock, so these 
regressions are the ones reported in Table 2. This accords with the results for purse 
seiners in Table 1. 
 
Table 2: Estimating a production function for the purse seine fishery 1932-71 by using effort and catch per 
unit of effort lagged one year as instrumental variables for effort and including the weather variable. t-
statistics in parentheses, ** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level.  
 
Effort 
variable 
Effort Stock Time Weather R
2
 
Fishermen 0.6367 
(2.30*) 
0.4998 
(2.83**) 
0.0270 
(1.58) 
0.4052 
(2.20*) 
0.6589 
Fishermen-
weeks 
0.8388 
(3.02*) 
0.2599 
(1.29) 
0.0319 
(2.08*) 
0.3858 
(2.15*) 
0.6776 
Boats 0.9446 
(3.43**) 
0.4615 
(3.38**) 
0.0199 
(1.28) 
0.3662 
(2.19*) 
0.7197 
Boat-weeks 1.0401 
(4.09**) 
0.2704 
(1.73) 
0.0305 
(2.25*) 
0.3517 
(2.20*) 
0.7464 
Value of 
boats 
0.6484 
(2.78**) 
0.4459 
(2.80**) 
-0.0193 
(0.71) 
0.4103 
(2.32*) 
0.6839 
Value of 
boats-weeks 
0.7498 
(3.39**) 
0.2805 
(1.58) 
-0.0199 
(0.84) 
0.3997 
(2.37*) 
0.6773 
 
 
As discussed above, we constructed both a weather variable and a length of season 
variable from the reports on the winter herring fishery. The weather variable is significant 
at the 5 percent level in all cases and has the expected positive sign. In Table 2, effort is 
defined both as a “stock” of fishermen or boats and as man-weeks and boat-weeks. It is 
noteworthy that incorporating the time dimension into effort reduces the estimates of b 
and makes it insignificant, thus supporting the statement that the significantly positive 
                                                 
9
 The correlation coefficient is 0.80 for the total stock and 0.75 for the spawning stock. 
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output elasticity of the stock found above may mean that a larger stock is available for 
capture for a longer period of time, but not necessarily that the catch per boat per unit of 
time (day or week) will increase with the stock. 
  
The technical innovations discussed above should have either increased the output from 
the herring fishery, for any given level of effort, or lowered the cost of effort. Since we 
do not have any cost data, we can only investigate the first effect. The production 
function could have been positively affected in two ways: (i) it could have been shifted 
upwards, leaving the parameters a and b unaffected, or (ii) one or both of these could 
have been affected as well. We return to the second point below for the power block and 
the sonar. 
 
Given the data at hand, the most promising way of dealing with the effects of the 
technological innovations discussed above is by variables showing the share of the boats 
using the equipment in question (see Figure 4). An introduction of a device such as the 
echo sounder should have shifted the production function upwards, more or less 
proportionately with the spreading of the echo sounder among the boats. Once all boats 
had this equipment, such shifts should have come to a halt, except that it may have taken 
some practice to learn how to use the echo sounder, and the equipment itself is likely to 
have improved over time. Ignoring these latter effects, the positive shift due to the echo 
sounder would have occurred over the period during which it was introduced, and 
thereafter the production function would have settled down at a higher but stable level. 
The introduction periods for new equipment sometimes overlap, and hence there is a high 
correlation between some of the variables showing the share of the fleet having a certain 
type of equipment. This causes multicollinearity problems, and so the most promising 
way of dealing with their effects is to incorporate them into the regression one at a time. 
The results from using the said technology variables in this way are shown in Table 3. 
Effort is defined with a time-dimension (man-weeks or boat weeks), as this tended to 
produce more significant coefficients for the technology variables. The estimates of a, b 
and the weather variable have been suppressed, but needless to say they change slightly 
from case to case. 
 
Table 3: Estimating technological progress with Equation (1) augmented by innovation variables. t-
statistics in parentheses, ** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
Variable Effort = man-weeks Effort = boat-weeks Effort = value of 
boats-weeks 
Power block 2.1781 (3.88**) 1.3570 (2.61*) 1.4526 (2.86**) 
Engine aux. boat 0.7434 (2.17*) 0.7728 (2.66*) -0.1941 (-0.37) 
Sonar 0.6437 (1.19) 0.3898 (0.85) -0.4525 (-1.01) 
Nylon 0.2333 (0.53) 0.1597 (0.42) -0.6179 (-1.80) 
Echo sounder 0.7689 (2.30*) 0.6782 (2.38*) -0.0630 (-0.08) 
Radar 0.5578 (0.88) 0.3272 (0.61) -0.6526 (-1.30) 
Radio 0.5371 (1.47) 0.4868 (1.56) -0.2591 (-0.51) 
War -0.4003 (-0.86) -0.2418 (-0.57) -0.3635 (-0.90) 
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In the regressions with effort defined as man-weeks or boat weeks, all the technology 
variables have the expected sign, and the war variable has the expected negative sign. 
Only three of the technology variables, the power block, engines in auxiliary boats, and 
the echo sounder, are significant however (at the 5 percent level). The magnitudes of 
these estimates can be compared, given the way the technology variables have been 
defined. The power block is the variable which has the largest effect, and it is greater for 
man-weeks than for boat-weeks, which is not surprising; as discussed earlier the power 
block drastically reduced the number of fishermen per boat, thereby enhancing the 
productivity of labor. 
 
The relative significance and magnitude of these estimates also make sense. The power 
block was probably the most important of them all; the drastic fall in the number of men 
per boat, earlier discussed, certainly indicates so. We would also expect the engines in 
auxiliary boats, the sonar and the echo sounder to have been important, the latter two 
because they made it easier to locate the fish. It is surprising, however, that the estimate 
of the sonar variable is not significant; one would have expected it to be at least as 
important as the echo sounder. That nylon seines and radar neither score particularly high 
nor pass tests of significance is not entirely surprising; nylon seines are stronger than 
cotton seines and need less care, but do not necessarily catch more fish, and radar is 
primarily a navigational equipment. 
 
The results for effort defined as value of boats-weeks are quite special, as all the 
estimates except for the power block are negative. The reason could be that the effects of 
the said innovations are already included in the reported value of the boats; the reports on 
the winter herring fishery do not inform us how these were calculated and whether 
equipment such as echo sounders was included or not. The introduction of this equipment 
may have coincided with boats becoming better and more expensive in general, so their 
effect would be drowned by the effect of the rising value of boats. 
 
Table 4: Estimating Equation (1) with weather and technology variable replacing time trend. t-statistics in 
parentheses, ** (*) denotes significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
 
Effort 
variable 
Effort (a) Stock (b) Weather Technology R
2
 
Man-weeks 0.6895 
(3.03**) 
0.5698 
(3.23**) 
0.3170 
(2.13*) 
0.6272 
(4.59**) 
0.7786 
Boat-weeks 0.8086 
(3.40**) 
0.4884 
(3.15**) 
0.3151 
(2.24*) 
0.6325 
(3.92**) 
0.8014 
 
Using the estimated values in Table 3, it is possible to define a technological progress 
variable as the sum of the products of these coefficients and the corresponding 
technology variable. This we have done for the three significant technology variables in 
the regressions for man-weeks and boat-weeks and used in a new regression, reported in 
Table 4. The results are reasonable, especially for boat-weeks; both a and b are 
significantly positive, b is significantly less than one, while a is not significantly less than 
one. The technology variable is significantly positive in both cases, and R
2
 is high. 
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Figure 5: Results of shortening the time series for estimating a, b and technological progress. 
 
Even if b is significantly positive in Table 4, we are not confident that the catch per unit 
of effort has been sensitive to the stock size throughout the whole period under 
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consideration. If the time series is shortened from the end, the point estimate of b falls 
and becomes insignificant as we get back to the late 1950s, as shown in Figure 5. 
Shortening the series from the beginning and up to 1950 has on the other hand a rather 
small effect on the estimates of b and the other parameters. 
 
From Figure 5 we see that the estimates of b as well as a and the technology variable 
suddenly change as we end the series in 1957 or earlier. So what happened in 1957? The 
purse seine catches in the winter herring fishery dropped from 4.9 million hectoliters in 
1957 to only 1.8 in 1958, while the stock size and the number of men and boats 
participating in the fishery were about the same in both years. The report on the winter 
herring fishery for 1958 tells us that the fishing was poor because there were few 
concentrations of fish and that the fish was not attracted by lights (in those days and 
earlier it was common to use electric lights to attract the fish at night). 
 
It is noteworthy that this “marker year” was a few years before the power block was 
introduced, and the sonar was just beginning to be introduced (about 5 percent of the 
boats had sonar in 1957, but 10 percent in 1958 and 1959).  This leads to the hypothesis 
that the sonar and the power block could in fact have made the catch per unit of effort 
more sensitive to the stocks size. Regression with an interaction term between the 
(logarithm of) the stock variable and the technology variable for sonar and power block, 
respectively, produces a positive estimate, which for the power block is significant at the 
1% level, indicating that the power block (and perhaps the sonar as well) did raise the 
value of b. The reason why this could have happened is that these devices made it easier 
to detect shoals of fish and encircle them. Hence, if for some behavioral reason the fish 
were difficult to detect or perhaps located far offshore these devices made it possible to 
detect and to pursue them wherever they were whereas in earlier years they would not 
have been available. The fact that a similar effect, albeit less strong, could also be noticed 
for the gill nets (cf. Section 2) detracts from this evidence; perhaps there was something 
special about the availability and migration of the stock prior to the late 1950s that 
produced this result. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
As stated in the Introduction, the technological revolution in the herring fishery in the 
1960s could have brought about the stock collapse in two ways, by (i) increasing the 
efficiency of the fishery, and (ii) qualitatively changing the production relationship so 
that the catch per unit of effort became less sensitive to the stock size. The first effect was 
undoubtedly there, although it seems primarily to have been associated with the power 
block and not so much with the sonar. The second effect does not seem to have been 
present. On the contrary, the catch per unit of effort seems to have become more sensitive 
to the size of the stock after 1957, at about the time the sonar was being adopted and a 
few years before the power block was introduced. A possible interpretation of this is that 
the said devices made it easier to find and scoop up the fish wherever it was located, 
whereas earlier the fishermen depended on seeing shoals of fish surface or attracting 
them with lights. When the fish did not “cooperate” by being in the right place at the right 
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time or being visible on the surface they were protected as it were before the sonar and 
the power block came on the scene. But even with this new technology in place, the catch 
per unit of effort did not increase linearly with the stock but at a diminishing rate. This 
made the herring more vulnerable to exploitation than it would otherwise have been. 
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